What will happen to Belarus?
On March 25, it was announced that Russia would emplace an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Belarus’ fate has for years appeared to written, in part due to the personal relationship between Putin and Lukashenko, but it is time to consider whether Belarus may be Russia’s next victim, rather than partner.
This past February, a leaked Russian document titled “Strategic Goals of the Russian Federation in Belarus” indicated Moscow’s desire to integrate Belarus into Russia — either as one whole or a part of a union — by 2030.
The document was dated 2021, an in some regards Russia has made great strides in its short-term goals; namely the restructuring of Belarus’ Constitution to favor Russian ideals, eliminating pro-Western sentiments, and bolstering military cooperation and integration.
The invasion of Ukraine, which Belarus offered itself as a staging ground for, is a solid indicator of those short term successes. But, you may also remember the series of anti-Lukashenko protests that swept through Belarus from 2020–2021 in which Russia assisted counter-protest actions with enforcers while ensuring Lukashenko won his sixth term. Changes to the Constitution followed, as did Belarus’ role in the Ukraine invasion.
With little concern from the international community, those goals were met quite smoothly. Now, with the short-term beyond us, Russia is looking to achieve is medium and long-term objectives.
The medium-term goals, allegedly set for 2025, are for Russia to have a tighter grasp on Belarussian society and soft power. How? By making strides towards the use of the Russian Ruble as currency, and for Belarussians to have a hassle-free system for obtaining a Russia passport. These tactics, if you remember, have been used cleverly before, and to great effect.
For the long-term, around 2030, Russia intends to have the two distinct cultures of Russia and Belarus merged into one via a shared interpretation of history, shared language and law, the backing of Russian loyalists in institutions, and control over media and education.
It should be noted that much of Russia’s success is dependent on the long-term integration — or rather, erasure — of Belarusian culture and society. Originally termed “Active Measures,” such tactics are reliable tools of Russian foreign policy that were used to great effect during the Cold War.
We must also consider that while Russia’s current position in the war in Ukraine looks bleak from a “1 v. 1” perspective, the sheer fact that it occurred, and Belarus assisted, puts Belarus and Lukashenko in a place of dependence on Russia. For their actions in fabricating a migrant crisis, and letting Russian troops stage an attack on Kyiv from their soil, Belarus has closed off itself from the arms of Western Europe. This remains, at least publicly, so long as Lukashenko is at the helm.
Which brings up a final point of contention: Lukashenko himself.
The decades-incumbent dictator has voiced multiple times, with some ambiguity, that Belarus is committed to its own soveriegnty. If such leaked documents, policies, or intentions are in the open — and look quite apparent by Russia’s actions — what interest does he have working with Putin?
It is clear Russia is not as powerful, in terms of a traditional ground force, as previously thought. Russia surely couldn’t manage two conflicts at once. They may even struggle with proxy gray zone competition in Belarus should Lukashenko act out. So why does he seem so complacent? So willing to seal Belarus’ fate?
Perhaps Putin, as he did for Ukraine’s Yanukovych, has him by the balls but is willing to reward him for playing into Russia’s hand. Force and policy by political realism are how Russia plays the game, after all.
