US ally Japan arms for war with China
On December 16, the Japanese government revealed its plans to double its military spending by 2027; a spending reallotment venture, across 5 years, that would see Japan spending more than $300 billion on defense.
The move is somewhat of a shock in the foreign affairs arena, as Japan has maintained a more pacifistic position in its foreign policy since the end of WWII. In 1947, under US occupation, Japan rewrote its Constitution. A part of that was a clause — specifically Article 9 — which states that Japan would pursue peace through law and diplomatic integration, rather than through the threat of force or military posturing. The article also maintains that Japan would not maintain a military with the means to project itself abroad, capable of full-scale war. All of this has been interpreted as Japan being strictly defensive.
It is now, amidst some regional existential threats, that Japan (certainly edged on by the US) is perhaps reevaluating what a defensive posture really means.
Japan has three major concerns that, from what Prime Minister Kishida has made clear, are Japan’s cause for the dedication to a surge in defense spending:
- China’s insistence on taking Taiwan by force, a threat many think could happen before Xi’s term ends in 2027
- North Korea’s unpredictability and growing ballistic missile capability
- Russia’s reckless war in Ukraine, which has shown disregard for international norms and has emboldened other adversaries such as China and North Korea
While those three reasons are more than enough justification for Japan to double-down on defense, perhaps there is a fourth, more complicated reason — the United States.
Like I briefly mentioned, the US likely played a role in getting Japan to commit to its new defense plan. Perhaps Ukraine has reminded the world that a unified effort is a strong deterrence against would be tyrants. It is in this regard that Japan’s investment is preventative — working to avoid its own “Ukraine Crisis” in the Pacific — by aligning itself with the United States’ policy trends. It is also, in this regard, a decision that makes the nature of Japan’s decision a justifiably defensive one.
Back to the topic at hand. The United States has struggled to develop good policy in the Pacific, specifically in how that policy aims to contain China and protect Taiwan. Under the Biden administration, the question of whether the US would get involved in Taiwan’s defense was ambiguous; Biden said we would respond, but then he went back on that word.
Part of the reason for that uncertainty is because of China’s developments that have greatly increased its military capability, versus the US’s inability to project all the power it has across the Pacific in the event of an open conflict. The US, while it has a major military presence in the Pacific, is uniquely unprepared for a full-blown war with China, as China possesses the ability to strike major strategic locations — such as airbases, naval yards, Radar sites, missile defense sites, and our cyber infrastructure. All before we can bring our full range of capabilities to bear.
This has been the core of America’s dilemma in regards to China; how to contain its capability and project our own. It is in that dilemma that Japan finds itself as a major strategic partner for the US, but also for the state of the World Order as it stands.
Japan’s goals — defense wise — are to develop the capabilities to conduct long range strikes onto enemy bases or missile sites. Enemy, of course, could mean China or North Korea. While Japan’s plan will rehaul the entire makeup of the Japanese Defense Force, missile defense and strike capabilities were particularly emphasized. In part because it could mean that Japan could not only defend itself better, but it could project that power back at, let’s speculate, China, should they unlawfully assault Taiwan and drag the US into a war.
This reality, should Japan fulfill its goals within the five year timeframe, could mean two things, for example: That China either feels forced to move on Taiwan sooner — and perhaps more recklessly, or that the CCP become deterred from seizing Taiwan at all.
Speaking of China’s position, I responded to a comment from a reader on another post and I think my response suffices as something relatively worthwhile given what we know now:
“I will say this regarding your response: I do not think the Chinese need to rethink their strategy as it pertains to their military, per se, but rather their politicking.
China has closed the gap with its military capability quite well; it is almost akin to a Great Wall of China except for surface-to-surface missiles and the like.
China’s military strategy is excellently poised for either a first strike on US positions in the Pacific, or to deter the US from re-entering the first island chain in the event of a prior retrograde. What I will concede, however, is that the PLA does not yet have the means to move enough troops via an assault into Taiwan.
Politicking is where the Chinese are desperate, in my opinion, hence some recent statements by the CCP stating they wish to integrate Taiwan via “diplomatic” means, but noting that force is not off the table.
The reason I maintain such a stance is because yes, Russia showed you can “cut against the grain” as it pertains to international norms/laws/respect, but the response the West has given Ukraine (in terms of money and weapons) is what I think has truly shocked other would-be peer aggressors such as China. Simply, it has been shown that yes, the world will respond rather than sit idly by in fear. Japan itself is now a good example of this in the Pacific. I certainly hope others follow suit.”
What do you think about the news of Japan’s biggest defense build up since WWII? Is it a substantial deterrent in the Pacific, or is it too little too late? Let me know in the comments.
Don’t forget to subscribe to The Countermeasure either here on Medium, or on my newsletter!
