How China uses narrative to increase control
China has been in the news a lot lately, and for multiple reasons. Xi Jinping has been on a streak of visits with foreign leaders after a period of absence, most notably with Biden and Germany’s Scholz. Mass anti-CCP, anti-Xi protests took the country by storm. And the passing of a major CCP figurehead — Jiang Zemin — have all occurred in a short period.
And with China’s presence in the news, I want to carefully explore the CCP’s use of narrative and rhetoric as a means to increase control in their country — especially at a time of great civil dissatisfaction.
Two things we will be looking at specifically are the change in rhetoric and procedure regarding Xi’s zero COVID policy and Xi’s speech at the memorial service for Jiang Zemin.
First let’s look at the memorial service for Zemin.
Jiang Zemin was a former President of China and a leading figure head of the CCP. Taking over as President in 1993 — right after the events at Tiananmen Square — Zemin really operated as the main figurehead of the CCP from 1989 to 2004. Zemin took over after Tiananmen because Zhao Ziyang was ousted for his support of the event. Zemin is a legacy figure in Chinese communist politics, with a legacy rivaling that of Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and now President Xi. What did Zemin do to become such a figure?
Zemin was the man ultimately responsible for China’s mind-blowing economic growth due to market reformation. His “socialist market economy,” as he put it, is the model China still prospers off of today. His leadership saw huge influxes of foreign investment as well, and that economic boom is what has bankrolled all other aspects of Chinese progress — think military modernization or the rapid rate at which China closed the gap on Western/American technology.
Zemin — while responsible for the threat we face today — is viewed as a legend in China. And this — this legacy and status — is precisely what Xi attempted to reflect in his speech at the Zemin’s memorial service. China has had a consistent track record of propping up the “greatness” and legacy of their past despots, and Xi sought to continue that trend.
Xi praised Zemin as a true CCP loyalist; one who made the “correct decision” following his rise to power after Tiananmen to quell “political disturbance.” Additionally, Xi sought to highlight Zemin’s status as a hero against Western aggression and those threats to Chinese socialism. Specifically, Zemin’s economic reform is what Xi reaffirmed as Zemin’s road to success.
Such narrative building, solidification, and dissemination is precisely what the CCP — and frankly, the Soviet-esque governments — rely on for developing control of their country. The Zemin memorial — which was nationally broadcasted if I am not mistaken — is a perfect example of this because it highlighted a biased and controlled opinion on Chinese greatness. That history, despite being one of modern China’s most controversial periods, was propped up by Xi as a time of great, infallible leadership. In making that assertion, Xi equates it to his own reign as he views himself as not only Zemin’s successor, but as a worthy and successful one. One who deserves total top-down control of the economy, political structure, and military — just as Zemin did.
In some ways, given the civil unrest in China, Zemin’s passing couldn’t have come at a more opportune time for the CCP.
Now take all that, and frame its significance into the reality of what has been occurring in China in the past week or so; mass, nationwide protests that are openly anti-Xi and anti-CCP. You can read more about that below:
With China having just experienced the most open and largescale protests since Tiananmen, Xi has also authorized the CCP to tactfully decrease the amount of protests via loosened COVID measures. Or at least the promise of them.
For those who do not know, the protests in China originally started because of the absurd an ineffective COVID procedures the CCP had in place. When they escalated, and people died as a result of oversight, the protests openly shifted to anti-government ones. Many observers, including myself, questioned whether or not a Tiananmen-like event would occur. Instead, the CCP have switched to minor changes in policy followed by misdirection and propaganda.
The CCP made promises that the COVID procedures would be loosened, but many of the absurd restrictions remain in place, such as neighborhood lockdowns or COVID camps; even aerial sanitization via drones. Only minor changes such as the use of public transportation without testing have come to fruition. All these “changes,” mind you, are really just a temporary loosening of the grip to non-violently end protests.
The point is, the rhetoric is there; the promises of loosened policy at the behest of the people’s request is made. But what will come of it is uncertain. If policy temporarily shifts, and COVID surges, then the scenario repeats itself.
One thing is certain, the CCP has used its grip on narrative through political and media control to great effect for years, and Xi is particularly adept at maneuvering the political landscape in China — a landscape that is more fragile than the CCP wants to let be known.
What do you think? Let me know in the comments below.
